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RECENT CASE COMMENTS
ADMINISTRATIVE LAw-REvOCATION OF PHYSICIAN's LICENSE-

In a recent North Carolina case,' the State Board of Medical Examiners revoked a physician's license to practice medicine for "grossly
immoral conduct", after due notice and hearing before the board.
The statute2 provides, "that the holder of the license so revoked shall
have the right to appeal to the Courts and if action of the Board of
Examiners be reversed, he shall be allowed to retain his license".
The question on appeal was whether the physician should have a
trial de novo before a judge and jury or only a review by the judge
of the proceedings before the board. Held, that as a matter of
statutory construction a trial de novo is required.
It is submitted that a different construction would not have done
violence to the statute. The broader aspect of the extent of judicial
review of administrative bodies might have been considered. That
the character and function of the State Board of Medical Examiners
is administrative or governmental seems clear. 3 The creation of such
a board is a proper exercise of the State's police power. 4 The procedure provided by the statute is also constitutional. A trial before
court and jury is not essential to due process of law.5 Moreover the
single hearing whether in a court or before an administrative official
meets the requirements of due process of law, although there is no
appeal.6 Notice and an opportunity to be heard are sufficient. In the
principal case no question is raised as to the sufficiency or fairness
of the hearing.
'Board of Medical Examiners et al v. Carroll, 194 N. C. 37, 138 S. E. 339

(1927).
'C. S., Supp. 1924, Sec. 6618.
'Munk v. Frink, 81 Neb. 631, 116 N. W. 525 (1908); State v. Hanson,
207 N. W. 769 (Iowa, 1926); State Board of Chiropractic Examiners v. The
Sup. Ct. Los Angeles County, 255 Pac. 749 (Cal., 1927); State ex rel. Mayers
v. Gray, 151 N. E. 125 (Ohio, 1926) ; Hughes v. Board of Medical Examiners,
134 S. E. 42 (Ga. 1926).
' Green '. Blanchard, 138 Ark. 137, 211 S. W. 375 (1919); Smith v. Board
of Medical Examiners, 140 Iowa 66, 117 N. W. 1116 (1908); Indiana Board
of Pharmacy v. Haag, 184 Ind. 333, 111 N. E. 178 (1916).
'Davdson v. New Orleans, 96 U. S. 97, 24 L. ed. 616 (1877) ; Dreyer v.
Illinois, 187 U. S. 71, 47 L. ed 79 (1902) ; Hurtado v. California,110 U. S. 516,
28 L. ed. 232 (1884).
'McKane v. Dreyer, 153 U. S. 684, 38 L. ed. 867 (1894); Andrews v.
Swarta, 156 U. S. 272, 39 L. ed. 422 (1895) ; Herold v. Frank, 191 U. S. 559
(1903) ; see Twining v. N. J., 211 U. S. 78, 111, 53 L. ed. 97 (1908) ; Rogers v.
Peck, 199 U. S. 425, 50 L. ed. 256 (1905) ; Hoivard v. Kentucky, 200 U. S. 164,
50 L. ed. 413 (1906) ; Rawlins v. Georgia, 201 U. S. 638, 50 L. ed. 899 (1906);
Felts v. Murphy, 201 U. S. 123, 50 L. ed. 689 (1906).
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The North Carolina Constitution guarantees trial by jury in
criminal cases 7 and in "controversies at law respecting property." 8
The fact that the conduct for which a physician's license is sought to
be revoked was criminal does not make the proceeding to revoke,
criminal. A conviction for the crime is not a condition precedent
to the revocation. 9 The right to practise medicine is not a vested
property right, but one granted, regulated and controlled by the State
for the welfare and safety of society.10 Hence the State may revoke
the right to practise medicine for good cause, and such revocation
alone is not taking property without due process of law."' Therefore, the Court in the instant case was at liberty to construe the
statute in consonance with the seeming weight of authority and the
best social policy.
It is submitted that the extent of judicial review of the action
of administrative bodies should be limited to two considerations:
(1) whether there was jurisdiction, (2) whether there was any
evidence before the board to support its decision, or whether the
decision was arbitrary and unreasonable.12 It seems that some
weight ought to be given to the findings of an expert administrative
3
body.'
H. G. GODWIN.
AGENCY-THE "FAMILY PURPOSE" DOCTRINE-The idea behind
the "family purpose" doctrine is not new in the law. There was a
time when the paterfamilias was responsible for the tortious conduct of all his household. In the development of the common law,
this became a liability based on the principles of agency.' Today
there are two lines of development holding the father responsible for
the torts of members of his family in their use of the family automobile. First is the so-called "family purpose" doctrine which is
"N. C. Constitution, Art. I, Sec. 13.

'Ibid., Sec. 19.
'Munk v. Frink, supra, note 3 at 633, 116 N. W. at 528; in matter of
Smith, 10 Wendell (N. Y.), 449.
"State v. Call, 121 N. C. 643, 28 S.E. 517 (1897) ; Dcnt v. West Va., 129
U. S. 114, 32 L. ed. 623 (1889) ; Hawker v. N. Y., 170 U. S.189, 42 L. ed.
1002 (1898).
'State v. Webster, 150 Ind. 607, 50 N. E. 750 (1898); Meffert v. State
Board of Medical Registration, 66 Ian. 710, 72 Pac. 247 (1903), 1 L. R. A.
(N. S.) 811 and note, affirmed in 195 U. S.625, 49 L. ed. 350.
"

Supra, note 3.

"See note, Powers of Highway Commission, 5 N. C. L. Rev. 150 (1926).

'Brittingham v. Stadiem, 151 N. C. 299, 66 S.E. 128 (1909).
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2
largely of judicial growth, but in some jurisdictions is incorporated
4
into statute.8 Second is compulsory automobile insurance, entirely a
matter of statute.5
To define the "family purpose" doctrine presents difficulties.
Several courts, in early decisions before the advent of automobiles,
have held a father liable for the negligence of the son in driving
the family carriage; it being stated that the son was the servant of
6
The Kentucky case was
the father in carrying out his business.
the precedent for the well known case of Stowe v. Morris in which
7
One of the latest
the "family purpose" doctrine was adopted.

encyclopedias on the law of automobiles says that this doctrine is
now supported by the weight of authority." But the truth of that
statement depends on the meaning of the doctrine. Some courts
have adopted the doctrine in a limited form, while others have applied
it to a wider scope of cases. Suppose the son of an automobile
owner was permitted by his father to drive other members of the
family, and while so doing negligently injured a third person. In
9
such a case the father was held liable by a court rejecting the "family
0
Suppose the son uses the car for his own
purpose" doctrine.'

pleasure, with permission of the owner, and negligently injures a
person.

Under the "family purpose" doctrine the father is held

liable for damages sustained by the injured person."

Let us attempt

a definition. The rule should take care of cases in which the family
automobile is involved but no theory of agency can be worked out,
'2 Blashfield's Cyclopedia of Automobile Law (1927), 1464.
' Michigan passed a statute imposing liability on the owner, although his
car was taken without his consent or knowledge. Held unconstitutional in
Daugherty v. Thomas, 174 Mich. 444, 134 N. W. 468, 2 N. C. C. A. 334 (1912).
The statute was amended so as to make the owner liable if the car was driven
with the express or implied consent or knowledge of the owner. Held valid,
as within the police power of the state in Stapleton v. Independent Brewing
Co., 198 Mich. 170, 164 N. W. 520 (1917); Iowa, Acts 38th Gen. Assem. c.
275 No. 12; Code 1924, Nos. 5025 and 5026, discussed in Seliene v. Wisner,
200 Ia. 1389, 206 N. W. 130 (1925).
'See Ore. L. Rev. 193 for discussion.
' Gen. Laws of Mass., Acts of May 1, 1925, chaps. 345, 346.
'Lashbrook v. Patten, 1 Duv. 316 (Ky., 1864) ; Schaefer v. Osterbrink, 67
Wis. 495, 30 N. W. 922, 58 Am. St. Rep. 875. It is interesting to note that
Kentucky has adopted the doctrine, whereas Wisconsin refuses to do so.
Papke v. Haerle, 189 Wis. 156, 207 N. W. 261 (1926) and citations therein.
Stowe v. Morris, 147 Ky. 386, 144 S. W. 52 (1912).
'2 Blashfield's Cyclopedia of Automobile Law (1927), 1464.
v. Salentine, 171 Wis. 632, 177 N. W. 886 (1920).
'Jaeger
10
Papke v. Haerle, supra, note 6.
U Miller v. Weck, 186 Ky. 552, 217 S. W. 904 (1920) ; Landry v. Oversen,
187 Ia. 284, 174 N. W. 255 (1919); Ambrose v. Young, 100 W. Va. 452, 130
S. E. 810 (1926).
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and no negligence of the parent shown, because in such cases the
father may be held on a sound basis of agency or negligence in tort.
Rule (suggested): a parent owning and maintaining an automobile
for the use and pleasure of his family is liable in damages
for any negligent driving on the part of any member of his family
whereby an actionable injury is caused. Statutes passed in several
states for the purpose of fixing liability on the parent or owner have
reached this result. Under this rule a prima facie case could be
made out by alleging that the father is the owner of the car used
for family purposes, and the plaintiff was injured by such car while
it was being driven negligently by his son.
North Carolina cases claim to follow the doctrine as is indicated
by the language used in the opinions. But the facts of those cases
would seem to indicate that the ordinary principles of agency and
negligence could be applied to sustain the decisions. Let us start
with this principle in mind. The mere relationship of parent and
child does not make the former liable in damages for a tort or negligent act of the latter.13 It must be shown that he approved such
acts, or that the child was his agent or servant. In the case of Linville
v. Nissen14 it was held that a non suit against the father was well
directed when it appeared that the son took the car against the commands of the father. Since that time the court has applied the rule
which may be stated generally as follows: where one provides an
automobile for the purpose of furnishing members of his family outdoor recreation, and for general family purposes, the use of the car
for such purpose by a member of the family is within the scope of
the owner's business, and where a child is driving the automobile
with the general consent of the owner, he may be regarded as carrying out the purpose for which it is maintained, so as to render the
owner liable for the negligent driving of a child on the principle of
agency.1 5 The last important decision of this line is the case of
Watts v Lefler.16 There an adult son living at home was accustomed to use the family car with the consent and approval of the
= See note 3, supra.

Brilttinghamv. Stadiem, supra, note 1.
"Linville v. Nissen, 162 N. C. 78, 77 S. E. 1096 (1913).
"Allen v. Garibaldi,187 N. C. 798, 123 S. E. 66 (1924) ; Wallace v. Squires,
186 N. C. 339, 119 S. E. 569 (1923) ; Tyree v. Tudor, 193 N. C. 340, 111 S. E.
714 (1922) ; Clark v. Sweaney, 176 N. C. 529, 97 S. E. 474 (1918) ; Williams
v. May, 173 N. C. 78, 91 S. E. 604 (1917) ; Taylor v. Stewart, 172 N. C. 203,
90 S. E. 134 (1916).
"Watts v. Lefler, 190 N. C. 722, 130 S. E. 630 (1925).
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owner. The facts of this case show no agency relationship or negligence on the part of the owner. The courts held the father liable in
damages for personal injuries proximately caused another by the
negligence of his son while driving it for his own purpose, saying
"... it is sufficient for the present purposes to state that the family
purpose doctrine, with respect to automobiles, has been adopted as
'17
the law of this jurisdiction in several recent decisions."
Whether the court will go to the extent of holding the father
liable for all torts committed by members of his family in the use
of the family automobile is conjectural.' 8 At least, the cases decided,
before Watts v. Lefler have not required the court to go beyond
the approved doctrines of liability in the law of agency and negligence.
JON WIIG.
AGENcY-EQUITY-SPECIFIC

PERFORMANCE IN FAoR OF AN

AGENT-REAL ESTATE BROKERAGE CONTRACTS-Plaintiff, a real
estate broker, entered into a contract with a Mrs. Burgess, owner
of a certain piece of land, by virtue of which he was given sole right
for thirty days to sell the said property for $7000 net to her, and she
bound herself thereby to deliver to plaintiff, or whomsoever he might
designate, a proper deed of conveyance. On the same day, plaintiff
entered into a contract of sale of the land with defendant for the
price of $8000. Defendant refused to perform. Plaintiff sued for
specific performance. Held. For plaintiff. Plaintiff had such
an interest in the subject-matter of the contract as to entitle him to
maintain such suit. Bowden v. Laing (W. Va. 1927) 138 S. E. 449.
There is a constant presumption that a known agent, acting as
such, intends to impose the obligations of the contract and secure
its advantages to him. As a general rule, therefore, where the
contract is made for and on account of the principal and in his name,
an action on such contract must be brought in the name of the principal, in whom the legal interest is vested, and not in the name of
the agent.' To this general rule there are four exceptions generally
recognized: first, where the agent contracts in his own name ;2 second,
190 N. C.722, 724.
"In sec. 5 of the proposed Uniform State Law for Aeronautics, the owner is

made absolutely liable for injuries to persons or property on the land or water
beneath the aircraft. This would seem to go to the extent of holding the
owner liable if the aircraft is operated by a thief.
12 Mechem, Agency (2nd ed.), 2020.

'Tinsley v. Dowell, 87 Tex. 23, 26 S. W. 946 (1894) ; Brown v. Morris,
83 N. C. 251 (1880).

82

THE NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

where the agent does not disclose his principal, who is unknown'; 8
third, where by the usages of trade, the agent is authorized to act
as owner of the property;4 and fourth, where the agent has an
interest in the subject-matter of the contract.5 Under the general
equitable rule that actions shall be prosecuted by the real parties
in interest, an equitable action for specific performance of the contract cannot be maintained by the agent, 6 except where he has a
beneficial interest3 The question presented is, what constitutes a
beneficial interest? Chitty Pl. (16 Am. Ed.) Vol. 1, p. 8 states the
doctrine thus: "When the agent has any beneficial interest in the
performance of the contract, as for commissions, etc., or a special
property, or interest in the subject-matter of the agreement, he may
support an action in his own name on the contract, as in the case
of a factor or broker, etc." While this view has been stated with
approval in several cases,8 yet it has been held that a mere interest
in commissions to be earned in case the contract is performed would
not, of itself, be sufficient, 9 and the rule has been limited to those
cases in which the agent has a lien upon, or a special property or interest in, the "subject-matter" of the contract.' 0 What is meant by a
special property or interest of a selling agent in the "subject-matter"
of the contract? Some courts take the view that in real estate brokerage contracts, it must be in the land itself ;"1 other courts take the
view that the interest of a lienor, assignee, cestui que trust, or jointobligee in the purchaser's obligation to pay the contract price constitutes such an interest.12 The first view seems to be irrevelant as the
'Barham v. Bell, 112 N. C. 131, 16 S. E. 903 (1893); Hewett v. Torson,

124 Ill. A. 375.
"Nabors v. Shippery, 15 Ala. 293 (1849); Close v. Hodges, 44 Minn. 204,
46 N. W. 335 (1890).
'Whitehead v. Potter,26 N. C. 257 (1844) ; Simon v. Trummer, 57 Or. 153,
158, 110 P. 786 (1910).
'Morton v. Stone, 39 Minn. 275, 39 S. W. 496 (1888) ; Fry, Specific Performance, 264.
'Hills v. McMunn, 232 I1. 488, 83 N. E. 963 (1908).
"U. S. Telegraph Co. v. Gildersleve, 29 Mo. 232, 96 Am. Dec. 519 (1868);
Whitehead v. Potter,supra, note 5.
'Tinsley v. Dowell, supra, note 2; Le Master v. Daihart Real Est. Agency,

56 Tex. Civ. A. 302, 121 S. W. 185 (1909); San Jacinto Rice Co. v. Lockett,
145 S. W. 1046 (1912); Chapman v. Lawhorn, 150 N. C. 166, 63 S. E. 721
(1909).
" U. S. Telegraph Co. v. Gildersleve, supra, note 8; 2 Mechem, Agency

(2nd ed.), 2035.

"Tinsley v. Dowell, supra, note 9; San Jacinto Co. v. Lockett, supra, note 9.
"U. S. Telegraph v. Gildersleve, supra, note 10; Groover v. Warfield, 50

Ga. 644 (1874) ; Thompson v. Kelly, 101 Mass. 291, 3 Am. Rep. 353 (1872) ;
Beardsley v. Schmidt, 120 Wis. 405, 102 Am. St. Rep. 991 (1905); Weston v.
Card, 96 Mich. 373, 56 N. W. 26 (1874).
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thing which the agent is seeking to enforce is not an interest in the
land, but an interest in the performance of the contract, i.e., in the
obligation of the purchaser to pay. Whether the agent obtains such
an interest would seem to depend on the nature of his contract with
his principal. In the usual type of real estate brokerage contract,
the agent is merely required to find a purchaser who is ready, willing
and able to purchase; or, as-in some instances, he may be required
and authorized to go further and make a binding contract of sale
with the purchaser; his commission is usually a certain percentage
of the selling-price, and his duty is performed and his commission
earned when he finds such purchaser or obtains a binding contract of
sale, as the case may be. Where such is the mode of dealing, the
broker has no interest in the purchaser's obligation under the contract
and it would seem clear that he could not maintain a suit for that
purpose. In some instances, however, as in the principal case, the
commissions of the agent are contingent upon the sale being consummated and it is agreed that the commission will be paid out of
the proceeds. Where such is the case, it seems that the agent should
be allowed to enforce in his own name a contract of sale made between
him and a third party. When a binding contract is made, a right
to a portion of the purchase price becomes vested in the agent; he,
therefore, has a joint interest with his principal in the proceeds of
the sale and in the obligation of the purchaser to pay; he has a right
to receive, and is responsible to his principal for, the price of the
14
property sold,' 3 and he has a lien thereon for his commissions,
which gives him a special property in the subject-matter of the contract, and hence a beneficial interest.
R. T. GILES.
AGENCY-SCOPE OF EmPLOYMENT-NEGLIGENCE OF AGENT-

In Peterset al v. A. & P. Tea Co., et al.,' the assistant superintendent
of defendant company took plaintiffs home in the company car
after business hours. Due to the employee's negligence, an accident
occurred, resulting in injuries to plaintiffs. A motion for non-suit
was refused. On appeal court held that the motion should have been
granted, because the employee was not acting within the scope of
his authority. The case of Grier v. Grier2 was cited in support of
"3Fuller v. Curtis, 100 Ind. 237, 50 Am. Rep. 786 (1885).
12 Mechem, Agency (2nd ed.), 2484.
1194

N. C. 173, 138 S. E. 595 (1927).

'192 N. C. 760, 135 S. E. 852 (1926).
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the decision. There a non-suit was granted on the ground that the
negligent act of an automobile salesman, driving a demonstration
car, -was not within the scope of his employment, as the salesman
was making a Sunday trip on a private mission.
If the agent or servant commits a tort in the course of his employment, the principal or master is liable. Hence the important
thing to determine in such cases is whether or not the agent or
servant was acting within the scope of his authority. The courts
have laid down several tests, but there seems to be little variance
between them. Such phrases as "in furtherance of the master's
business", 8 "necessary to accomplish the purpose of the employment", 4 "connected with some mission or the performance of some
service for the principal",5 or "executing his orders or doing his
work" are all found in the court's definition of "scope of employment." The statement of principle seems quite dear, but the difficulty comes in the application of these tests to the facts of each
particular case.
In the case of Gallop v. Clark,7 employee was guard of the game
preserves of a hunting club. He shot a hunter on the preserve, and
the jury found that he was acting within the apparent scope of his
employment. In Marlowe v. Bland,8 a non-suit was granted on the
ground that a farmhand was not within the scope of his employment
where he was directed to cutand pile certain cornstalks, but in addition to this he set fire to the pile and the flames spread to plaintiff's
property. In Kelly v. Newark Shoe Stores Co., 9 whether employee
was acting within the scope of his authority was held to be a question for the jury, when, as manager of one of defendant's chain
stores, he had plaintiff wrongfully arrested on a charge of embezzling the company funds. In Butler v. Mfg. Co.,19 a night watchman
was found by the jury to be acting without the scope of his authority
when he made a false arrest outside the inclosure within which he
was employed to work; and the court held that the motion for a
non-suit had been properly denied.
'Sawyer v. R. R., 142 N. C. 1, 54 S. E. 793, 115 A. St. R. 716, 9 Ann. Cas.
*Marlowe v. Bland, 154 N. C. 140, 69 S .E. 752, 47 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1116
(1910).

440 (1906).

'Bilyeu v. Beck, 178 N. C. 481, 100 S. E. 891 (1919).

'Dover v. Mfg. Co., 157 N. C. 324, 72 S. E. 1067, 46 L. R. A. (N. S.) 199
(1911).
7188 N. C. 186, 124 S. E. 145 (1924).
'154 N. C. 140, 69 S. E. 793, 47 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1116 (1910).
9190 N. C. 406, 130 S. E. 32 (1925).
10182 N. C. 547, 109 S. E. 559 (1921).
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As may be seen from the above cases no hard and fast rule can
be laid down to determine when the agent or servant is within the
scope of his authority. In a recent treatise it is stated that a tort
is within such scope if the agent was motivated in part at least by
a desire to serve his employer, and if the act was not an extreme
deviation from the normal conduct of such employees. 1 If the
agent's motive was a personal one or if his conduct was not within
the limits of reasonable deviation, there should be a non-suit. If
his motive was to serve his employer and his act was not an unreasonable deviation, the employer is liable as a matter of law. However,
if there is any doubt as to his motive or as to the reasonableness of
the deviation, the case should go to the jury. When viewed in the
light of this "motivation-deviation" test, the North Carolina cases
cited above appear to be in accord with the weight of authority on
the question of scope of employment.
J. C. RODMAN, JR.
APPEAL AND ElutoR-In the recent North Carolina case of Insurance Co. v. Boddie,' the evidence of a physician was offered to show
reason for cancellation of policy of insurance. The defendant objected on ground that communication was privileged under C. S.,
Sec. 1798. The statute provides that the presiding judge may admit
such evidence if in his opinion it is necessary for the administration
of justice. Over the objection based on the statute the court admitted the evidence. This ruling was assigned as error and on
appeal the record failed to show that the trial judge found that in
his opinion the admission of the evidence was necessary for the
administration of justice. Held: There was error where record
failed to show that such a finding was made by trial judge.
At common law the only privileged communication recognized
at law was that between attorney and client.2 The medical profession has considered as inviolate the confidences between its members and their patients from a very early date,3 but they were not
recognized at law as privileged communications until made so by
4
statute.
Tiffany, Agency (2d ed. by Powell), 105.
1Insurance
Co. v. Boddie, 194 N. C. 199,

139 S. E. 228 (1927).

Bird v. Lovelace, Cary 88 (1577).

'Principle of Medical Ethics adopted by the American Medical Association
1903.
'New York first in 1828. Missouri followed in 1835 and now privilege
granted by about half of states. See Wigmore on Evidence, Sec. 2380.
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The admission and exclusion of evidence is governed in general
by two types of rules: (1) The hard and fast type which allows the
admission of evidence only when it conforms to the requirements
of the rule which governs it. (2) The type which allows the judge
a certain discretionary latitude in the admission and exclusion of
the evidence according to the circumstances of the particular case.
The vagueness of the test laid down by the statute in this case seems
to indicate the rule here is of the latter type. Was the admission
of this evidence without record of a reason for its admission reversible error?
Upon appeal the complaining party has the burden of showing
error.5 This is an application of the presumption of regularity to
the acts of public officials,6 even when the duty performed is one
regulated by statute. 7 The judgment of the lower court is based
upon the findings of the court and jury, and where the record fails
to show what findings were made by the trial court it is presumed
that facts necessary to support the judgment existed, 8 for the presumption is against error.9
In this case the defendant claimed that the physician's testimony
was privileged and objected to its admission. Ordinarily the trial
judge has no obligation to announce or incorporate as a part of the
record his reason for a ruling, but in this case the opinion suggests
that a record of why the physician testified is necessary to protect
him from criticism and the loss of prestige and practice. This suggestion may be compared with a comment made under similar circumstances by Lord Mansfield in Duchess of Kingston's trial, 20
How. St. Tr. 573 (1776) : "If a surgeon was voluntarily to reveal
these secrets, to be sure, he would be guilty of a breach of honor and
of great indiscretion, but to give that information in a court of justice, which by the law of the land he is bound to do, will never be
imputed to him as any indiscretion whatever."
The precise point of this case has not been decided elsewhere,
but a close analogy is presented by cases which have arisen under a
Massachusetts statute.10 The statute provides that for the declara'McCrii men v. Parish, 116 N. C. 614, 21 S. E. 407 (1895) ; in re will of
S. E. 977 (1913).
W. R. Smith, 163 N. C. 464, 79
810 R. C. L. 880. Gamble v. Andrews, 187 Ala. 302, 65 So. 525 (1914).
v. Tefft, 250 P. 346 (Wash., 1926).
8 Elsom
Jones v. Fowler, 161 N. C. 354, 77 S. E. 415 (1913).
' Todd v. Mackie, 160 N. C. 352, 76 S. E. 245 (1912).

"0Massachusetts: Stat. 1898 c. 535, Gen. L. 1920, c. 233, Sec. 65, "A declaration of a deceased person shall not be inadmissible in evidence as hearsay if
court finds it was made in good faith before the commencement of the action
and upon the personal knowledge of the declarant."
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tions of a deceased person to be introduced in evidence the trial
judge must find that the declarations were made in good faith from
personal knowledge of the declarant before the beginning of the
controversy. Under this statute declarations were admitted and on
appeal the record failed to show that these findings had been made
by the trial judge. The court made the following statement concerning the failure of the record to show findings: "While the preliminary finding of good faith of the declarant by the court is
required, this judicial action is to be inferred by the admission of
the evidence.""
J. C. KESLER.
CONTRACTS-ANTECEDENT
STRICTIONS

IN

CONTRAT-In

FRAUD-EFFECT

OF WRITTEN

RE-

a recent federal case, action was

brought for unpaid balance of purchase price of plaintiff's business
including unfilled contracts for the sale of products with customers.
The written contract provided that it was without guaranty as to
said contracts or sales, that they were to be delivered without prejudice, that the writing contained all the terms of the sale, and that
the sale was without warranties not therein specified. Evidence of
fraudulent representations as to said contracts with customers as an
inducement to the making of the contract was excluded by the trial
judge, Held--error. The restrictive clauses did not amount to a
statement that prior representations were not an inducement to the
contract. Arnold v. National Analine Chem. Co., Inc., 20 Fed.
(2nd) 364 (1927).
That a clause in a written contract to the effect that prior representations were not an inducement to the making of the contract
will preclude the defense of antecedent fraud has been the holding
of several state courts, apparently on the theory that considerations
of certainty and the prevention of vexatious litigation overbalance
any occasional injury arising due to antecedent fraud.' But there
is weighty authority to the contrary following the principle that
fraud vitiates any contract.2 On principle that is the correct view.
'Dickin.son v. City of Boston, 188 Mass. 595, 75 N. E. 68 (1905); accord:
Dixon v. New England Railroad, 179 Mass. 242, 60 N. E. 581 (1901) ; Brook
v.Holden, 175 Mass. 137, 55 N. E. 802 (1900).
' Colonial Development Corp. v. Bragdon, 219 Mass. 170, 106 N. E. 633
(1914) ; O'Meara v. Smyth, 243 Mass. 188, 147 N. E. 294 (1925) ; Threshing
Machine Co. v. Broach, 137 Ga. 602, 73 S. E. 1063 (1912). Cf. recent case of
Colt Co. v. Conner, 194 N. C. 344, 139 S. E. 694 (1927).
2Mackson v. State, 205 N. Y. Supp. 658 (1924) ; Pearson and Son, Ltd. v.
Mayor of Dublin, App. Cas. 351 (1907); II Williston, Contracts (1920), Sec.
811; 5 Wigmore, Evidence (1923), Sec. 2439.
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The conflict arises over considerations of public policy. The principal case was correctly decided without the necessity of adopting
either view. Antecedent representations made to induce the buyer
to contract but not forming a part of the contract when completed
are not warranties. 4 A clause that the contract contains all the
terms and agreements between the parties does not bar the defense
of fraud. 5 Obviously a clause that there were no guaranties as
to the subject matter of a sale would not of itself preclude alleging
fraud as a defense. The only import of the phrase "without prejudice" is that the delivery of the contracts by one party and their
receipt by the other, as between themselves, will not by reason of
such delivery and receipt have any effect upon the rights of the
parties in the premises.8 The parole evidence rule has no application. 7
The view of the courts in regard to incontestible clauses in insurance policies well illustrates their deeper inclination to uphold the
rule that fraud in the inception vitiates any contract. If the clause
provides that the policy shall be incontestible from the outset it is
invalid and antecedent fraud may be relied upon as a defense to an
action upon the policy. 8 But clauses making policies incontestible
after a reasonable period have been widely held to preclude defenses
of fraud after the expiration of such period on the theory that they
simply provide shorter statutes of limitation.9

J. B.

FORDHAM.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-MUNICIPAL ORDINANCE FIXING

HOURS

WAGES ON PUBLIC WoRK-The Mayor and City Council of
Atlanta, Georgia, enacted an ordinance which established a minimum
wage scale and a maximum work day of eight hours for certain
skilled workers engaged in the construction and repair of public
buildings and bridges. The ordinance included both the workers
engaged directly by the city and those employed by contractors operating under a contract with the city. The lower court gave judgment for the city in an action to enjoin the enforcement of the ordiAND

• (1925) Col. L. Rev. 231.
'Benjamin, Sales (6th ed., 1920), 490.
'Elliott Supply Co. v. Green, 35 N. D. 641, 160 N. W. 1002 (1917).

' Genet v. Pres. etc., of Del. & H. Canal Co., 170 N. Y. 278, 63 N. E. 351
(1902).
"Berrendo Irrigating Farms Co. v. Jacobs, 23 N. M. 290, 168 Pac. 483
(1917) ; 5 Wigmore, Evidence (1923), Sec. 2439.
"Reagan v. Union Mutual Life Ins. Co., 189 Mass. 555, 76 N. E. 217 (1905).
'(1919) 6 A. L. R. 441, note, p. 453.
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nance. Held by the Georgia Supreme Court that the ordinance was
void as being ultra vires and illegal.1
The court rested its decision upon the principle laid down in
City of Atlanta v. Stein,2 holding that the controlling facts in that
case were similar to the facts in the principal case.
In City of Atlanta v. Stein, an ordinance required all city printing
to carry the union label of the Allied Printing Trades Council.
The city contracted with a union label shop, and Stein filed a petition
to enjoin the parties from carrying the ordinance into effect. An
injunction was granted on the grounds that the ordinance was ultra
vires because it tended to encourage monopoly and put a heavier
burden on the tax payer than if free competition were allowed to
prevail.
It is not clear that the grounds for the decision in the Stein case
properly fit the facts in the Wilson case. Judge Hines in his dissent
points out that the ordinance in the Wilson case does not restrict
the granting of contracts for public work to a select group. On the
contrary the ordinance leaves all contractors free to compete, provided they subscribe to the standards established by the ordinance.
Consequently the question of monopoly upon which the Stein case
turned was not present in the Wilson case.
As to the other point involved in the decision of the Stein case,
that the ordinance was a burden on the tax payers because of the
restriction put on free competition for workers, Judge Hines maintains that this is a question of administrative policy with which the
courts should not interfere unless the acts of the municipal authorities are ultra vires, fraudulent, or corrupt.
Should the case be appealed to the U. S. Supreme Court it is
reasonable to expect that the court will follow its decision in Atkin
v. Kansas.3 Here the court upheld a statute passed by the state
legislature establishing an eight hour day and requiring the current
rate of wages 4 to be paid on all work done by the state and its
municipalities, when done either directly or through contractors: Mr.
'Wilson et at v. City of Atlanta, 139 S. E. 148 (Ga., 1927).
' City of Atlanta v. Stein, 111 Ga. 789, 36 S. E. 932 (1900).
'Atkin v. Kansas, 191 U. S. 207, 24 S. Ct. 124 (1903).
'In Connolly, Commissioner of Labor of Oklahoma v. General Construction Company, 269 U. S. 385, 46 S. Ct. 126 (1926) the phrase "current rate
of per diem wages in the locality" was held invalid as so vague and indefinite
that the guaranty of due process "cannot be allowed to rest upon a support
so equivocal." Wilson v. City of Atlanta is not open to this objection since
the wage scale in question is specifically stated.
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Justice Harlan, delivering the opinion, said: "We rest our decision
upon the broad ground that the work being of a public character
absolutely under the control of the state and its municipal agents
acting by its authority, it is for the state to prescribe the conditions
under which it will permit work of that kind to be done."
The Georgia Supreme Court in putting the stamp of unreasonableness on the ordinance in the Wlison case is not in accord with
the best authority. The decision also involves the court in an economic difficulty. Manufacturers in the United States are finding
that lower costs of production are not inconsistent with shorter
hours and higher wages. It is difficult in the light of this experience
to accept the court's economic theory that the wage and hour standards established by the ordinance necessarily put an additional burden on the taxpayer, which would not appear if free competition
were allowed to prevail.
Municipalities today are large employers of labor. A reasonable
employment policy should not be interfered with by the courts, particularly when such a policy is in accord with the general economic
tendency of the times.
THOMAS

W.

HOLLAND.

Assistant Professor of Economics,
University of North Carolina.
CONSTITUTIONAL

LAW-MUNICIPAL

REGULATION

OF JEWELRY

AucTIoNs-The petitioners were engaged in the jewelry auctioning
business in the city of Atlanta. One of the distinctive features of
the jewelry auction business is that large crowds attend, and buy at,
the sales held at night. It appeared that the petitioners' business was
greatly effecting that of the regular jewelry merchants, who, in
order to combat this strong competition, organized and "lobbied
through" the passage of the city ordinance in question, which, among
other things, prohibited the sale of jewelry at auction between the
hours of 6 p.m. and 6 a.m. In the instant case the petitioners sought
to have this ordinance declared unconstitutional. Held, on appeal,
that the ordinance was constitutional. 1
The contention of the petitioners that the ordinance in question
was enacted for the purpose of protecting the regular jewelry merchants by stifling petitioners' competition may be, and does appear
SClein et al v. City of Atlanta, 139 S. E. 46 (Ga., 1927).
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to be true, but nothing is better settled than the principle that the
motives of a legislative body, or its members, in passing a legal enactment, cannot be judicially enquired into.2
Likewise, the general legality of the ordinance in question should
not be contested, considering it settled beyond question that a
municipality has the right to pass an ordinance regulating auctions
and other businesses.3 All authorities are in accord, however, that4
such regulation must be reasonable, and must not be discriminatory.
The only hint in the court's opinion as to the evil to be prevented
or good promoted by the ordinance is that ". . . the sale of jevelry at night affords an opportunity for fraud and imposition upon
the buyer. . . ." This same reason would also close the doors
of the regular jewelry merchants. Evidently the court did not intend such an inference, but only that the dangers of imposition were
peculiar to the auctioning of jewelry at night, with its crowded
auction room and artificial lighting. These reasons, however, do not
sufficiently make out the case of probable imposition upon the buyer.
He is as free to examine the article in the auction. room as in the
regular jewelry store. Artificial lighting is not peculiar to jewelry
auctions at night, but is the case in all merchandising. Viewed from
this angle, the ordinance appears to be unreasonable and discriminatory. Further, the ordinance seems to go beyond the necessity of
the case.6 Many municipalities have found that the stringent licensing and bonding of reputable auctioneers is quite sufficient to insure
fair selling and to secure the public against imposition and fraud.
A. S. KARTUS.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-TAXATION-COUNTY'S

LIABILITY TO ITS

EMPLOYEES UNDER WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT-In Floyd

'People v. Gardner, 143 Mich. 104, 106 N. W. 541 (1906); Hadacheck v.
Alexander, 169 Cal. 616, 147 Pac. 259 (1915).
"Bazemore v. State, 121 Ga. 619, 49 S. E. 701 (1905).
'Miller v. Greenville, 134 S. C. 314, 132 S. E. 591 (1926); Roanoke v.
Fisher,137 Va. 75, 119 S. E. 259 (1923).

But whether a statute like the one

in question is reasonable has caused a split of authority: Held valid: People
v. Weller, 237 N. Y. 316, 143 N. E. 205, 38 A. L. R. 613 (1924); Holsman v.
Thomas, 112 Ohio St. 397, 147 N. E. 750, 39 A. L. R. 760 (1925); Roanoke v.
Fisler,supra. Held invalid: People v. Gibbs, 186 Mich. 127, 152 N. W. 1053,
Ann. Cas. 1917B, 830, note (1915); Robinson v. Woods, 196 N. Y. Supp. 209
(1922) ; Hayes v. City of Appleton, 24 Wis. 452 (1869).
12 Dillon, Mun. Corp. (5th ed.), Sec. 666: "If the regulation . . . interferes with the enjoyment of individual rights beyond the necessity of the case,

such regulations exceed the legislative authority and cannot be sustained."
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County v. Scogginsl the question was whether or not a statute providing that the counties of the state should compensate injured employees was constitutional. Plaintiff was employed by the county to
repair the windows and doors of the jail-house. While so engaged
he received injuries which entitled him to compensation under the
act, and the Industrial Commission awarded him compensation. The
county appealed on the ground that the statute was unconstitutional
in that it provided for the expenditure of money for purposes not
stated in the constitution. 2 The defendant's contention was sustained
and the case dismissed.
Taking cognizance of the policy that where the constitutionality
of a statute is at issue all doubt should be decided in favor of its
validity,3 the court said that "the repugnancy between the statute
and the constitution must be clear and palpable"; and with this rule
in mind decided that the terms of the statute involved the appropriation of money for purposes beyond those enumerated by the
constitution.
Even though.the constitution did not specifically state that money
could be raised for the purpose in question, it stated that money
could be raised by taxation for the purpose of erecting and keeping
in repair public buildings and bridges, to maintain and support prisoners. The payment of claims against the county arising from
injuries sustained while carrying out the purpose stated does not
seem to be a misapplication of the funds.
By the limited terms of the constitution the only way the payment of compensation by the county can be justified is on the the6ry
that the liability for the injury to the employee is incidental to the
repair of the public building (jail-house in this case). In prior cases
the Georgia court justified the use of money appropriated for the
building of bridges for the payment of claims against the county:
in one case for injuries received by a horse while crossing a bridge ;4
in another for injuries to a woman received by her due to absence
of railings on the bridge which she was crossing ;5 in another for
injuries to adjoining land caused by the erection of a bridge ;O and
Floyd County v. Scoggins, 139 S. E. 11 (Ga,

'Art. 7, sec. 6, par. 2, Ga. Const.

1927).

' Wright v. Hirsch, 155 Ga. 229, 116 S. E. 795 (1923) ; Park v. Candler, 114

Ga. 466, 40 S. E. 523 (1902) ; Bickett v. State Tax Commission, 177 N. C. 423,
99 S. E. 415 (1919).
'Dearing v. Shepherd, 78 Ga. 28 (1886).
County of Gwinnett v. Dunn, 74 Ga. 358 (1884).
'Smith v. Floyd County, 85 Ga. 420, 11 S. E. 850 (1890).
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in one case the court went so far as to say that the general authority
delegated by the legislature to counties to levy taxes gave the counties
the power to levy taxes to pay the salaries of county officials, where
prior thereto such salaries were paid through the fee system.7
The Georgia court in these cases permitted tax money raised for
a purpose stated by the constitution to be used to pay claims of third
persons arising from the carrying out of that purpose, and it seems
that the court would have been in line with these decisions had it
affirmed the decision of the Industrial Commission. The relationship between injuries received by an employee performing a task
explicitly provided for in the constitution seems to be as close as
the relationship of injuries to third persons received while that task
was being performed. Aside from the prior decisions the injuries
to plaintiff were incidental to the repair of a public building used for
purposes of maintaining and supporting prisoners, and a reasonable
interpretation of the constitution does not seem to show a clear and
palpable repugnance between it and the statute which provides compensation for such injuries.
M. P. MYERS.
CORPORATIONS -

JURISDICTION

-

MAINTENANCE

SERVICE

BY

RESIDENT EMPLOYEES AS DOING BUSINESS-In Cone v. New Britain
Machine Co., 20 Fed. (2nd) 593 (1927), the defendant, a Connecticut corporation, with its factories and executive offices in New
Britain, manufactures and sells machines to all parts of the United
States. While it has no office or factory or repair shop in Ohio, the
company employs an expert mechanic who lives in Columbus, Ohio,
whose duty it is to visit the plants of customers in Ohio from time
to time after the sale is completed and the machines are installed,
and adjust these so that they may operate at a maximum efficiency.
This is his sole duty, and he is employed and paid by the defendant.
Held sufficient to make the defendant subject to service of process
on the ground that defendant is doing business in the state.
Concerning the problem raised in the principle case, the following language shows the lack of any fixed rules: "No all embracing
rule has been laid down as to what constitutes the manner of doing
business by. a foreign corporation to subject it to process in a given
jurisdiction. Each case must be determined on its own facts. The
'Abbott v. Commissioners of Fulton County, 160 Ga. 657, 129 S. E. 38
(1925).
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business done must be such in character and extent to warrant the
inference that it has subjected itself to the jurisdiction."'
The following transactions have been held to constitute doing
business in the state: the making of loans ;2 the making of contracts
of insurance, with the intention that the adjuster go into the state to
settle claims ;3 the construction of railroads ;4 selling and assembling,
erecting or installing machinery ;5 the purchase of goods for resale ;G
the operation of a manufacturing plant ;7 the erection of lightning
rods, when this was a condition of the sale ;8 and the solicitation of
orders for aluminum ware, where sales agent had no power to complete contract, but maintained an office paying telephone, light bills,
etc. 9
In considering these and similar cases certain elements appear to
be required to constitute doing business within a state for purpose of
service of process: (1) Some relatively continuous commercial transaction within the state, 10 (2) physical presence,'1 (3) an agent who
is acting for and upon whom service of piocess will reasonably give
notice to the defendant, 12 (4) local, as contrasted with interstate
transactions."3 These are not rigid requirements, however, and may
vary with extrinsic factors; the court being inclined to make service
valid if it will reasonably give notice, and if the corporation is per14
forming such acts as materially affect its citizens.
The principal case seems to be correctly decided in spite of a
vigorous dissent which contends that the service is merely incidental
to and a part of defendant's interstate business of manufacturing
and selling machines. 15 The defendant has been engaged in corn'Day, J., in St. Louis and S. W. R. R. Co. v. Alexander, 227 U. S.218, 227,
33 Supreme Ct. 245 (1913).
'National Merc. Co. v. Watson, 215 Fed. 929 (1914).
'Penn. Ins. Co. v. Meyer, 197 U. S. 407, 55 S. Ct. 483 (1904).
' Pittsburgh Const. Co. v. Westside R. R. Co., 154 Fed. 929 (1907).
'Beech v. Kerr Turbine Co., 243 Fed. 706 (1917).

'In re Conecuch Pine Lumber Co., 180 Fed. 249 (1910).
'Diamond Glue Co. v. U. S. Glue Co., 187 U. S. 611 (1903).
'Browning v. Waycross, 233 U. S. 16, 34 S. Ct. 578, 59 L. Ed. 828 (1916).
'Haskell
v. Aluminum Co., 14 Fed. (2nd) 864 (1926).
"0Riverside Mills v. Menefre, 237 U. S.189, 35 S. Ct. 579 (1913).
Minn. Commercial Men's Asso. v. Benn, 261 U. S.140, 43 S. Ct. 293, 67
L. Ed. 573 (1923).

"Haskell v. Aluminum Co., .upra, note 9.
Browning v. Waycross, supra, note 8.
Smolik v. Philadelphia and Reading Coal and Iron Co., 222 Fed. 148
(1915). See note (1927) 5 N. C. L. Rev. 159; also 5 N. C. L. Rev. 361. See
recent case of Locker Co. v. Berger Mfg. Co., 21 F (2d) 139 (D. C. Ohio
1927), engaging in litigation is not doing business; Zinmners v.Dodge Bros.,
21 F (2d) 152 (D. C. Ill. 1927).
'This opinion is strengthened by the fact that the tendency is to make it

easy to obtain jurisdiction over foreign corporations-Beech Kerr Turbine Co.,
supra, note 5.
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mercial transactions in Ohio for many years. It has full time employees in Ohio, who would be reasonably certain to notify the
defendant of any service of process. The defendant actually serviced the machines which were operating in Ohio, and the service is
clearly not a part of the interstate transactions.
D. K. MOORE.
CRIMINAL LAW-AssAULT WITH INTENT TO MURDER-NEGLIGENCE AS SPECIFIC INTENT-Defendant, intoxicated, driving his car

in excess of the speed limit, collided with another car, seriously
injuring one of its occupants. A conviction for assault with intent
to murder was upheld by the Georgia Court of Appeals.' The decision presents an extension of the doctrine that criminal intent may be
inferred from negligence.
The exact position of intention, as an essential ingredient of
modern criminal law, is hard to define. In primitive law an antisocial act was the sole element of crime. 2 Common law concepts
developed around the two-fold requirement of (1) an anti-social act,
accompanied by (2) an intent to commit the act. 3 The latter element has been whittled away by a process of rationalization, the
development of which falls into three stages: (1) a man is presumed
to intend that which he does ;4 (2) one is presumed to intend the
natural and probable consequences of his acts ;5 and (3) negligence,
SChambliss v. State, 139 S. E. 80 (Ga., 1927).

Criminology and Penology (1926), c. 1; ibid., c. 14.
* A consequence of ecclesiastical influence which has resulted in a confusion
of two distinct ideas: crime, and the punishment therefor. The former is
determined by the injurious act, the latter by the individual responsibility,
which is even today measured by the church's yard-stick-intent.
'This departure was necessitated by the impossibility of proving the existence of an intent, which is purely subjective; it shifts the burden of the
impossibility to the defendant. Most psychologists would deny its validity,
and those with strong mechanistic or extreme behavioristic leanings would
2Gillin,

hold that the reverse is more nearly true-what one does is governed by
forces over which he has little or no control in the ordinary meaning of con-

trol. But, however false it may be, the rationalization serves the purpose of
the court in subordinating intent, yet remaining within the law. Cf. U. S. v.

Leathers, Fed. Cas. No. 15,581 (1879).

'This merely attaches intent to the act done, disregarding the real intent.
Its application has been limited to cases in which the act intended was itself

unlawful; and some courts have attempted to distinguish between such acts

when mala in se, i.e., prohibited by the modus operandi of society before modern methods of legislation, and when mala prohibita, i.e., prohibited by the
modus operandi of society after modern methods of legislation. State v. Horton, 139 N. C. 588. But, in either case, the act is forbidden because society
found it necessary to do so for its own preservation. Fundamentally the two
cannot be differentiated, and some courts are even now ready to so admit.
State v. Mclver, 175 N. C. 761 (1918).
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amounting to gross or wanton conduct, may be the equivalent of
intent, either general or specific.0 Wherefore, some writers have
gone so far as to assert that there is no place for a doctrine of intent
as a necessary ingredient of crime'
As long as the courts apply their rationalizations simply as means
to an end, they are on solid ground both historically and sociologically. Given an act from which society has suffered, the courts
should apply the pertinent formula. This view is well supported. 8
But to extend the application beyond the consummated anti-socal
act into the field of attempts, as does the instant case, seems unwarranted. Defendant is, no doubt, guilty of assault and battery;o
and had death resulted, a conviction for manslaughter, or even for
murder, would be justified. 10 But in a charge of assault with intent
to murder, intent is the gist of the crime. Can it be said upon the
facts of this case that peace and order have been violated by an
unlawful and anti-social intent to take human life? To press the
process of rationalization to the extent, not only of negativing the
necessity of an otherwise required intention, but to affirmatively
supplying it where it dearly did not exist, does violence to the
rationalized mechanism as well as to the common law concept of
crime."
W. NEY EVANS.

S. E. ROGERS.
EVIDENCE-EXPECTANCY-USE OF MORTUARY TABLES-In Taylor v. Construction Co.," plaintiff sustained permanent physical inju'The courts do not agree upon what constitutes gross or wanton negligence, but it is clear that such negligence is merely another rationalized
mechanism for reasoning intent out of the law of crimes.
'Albert Levitt, Doctrine of Men's Rea (1919), 17 Ill. L. Rev. 578.
'Lanier v. State, 28 Ga. App. 97, 110 S. E. 682 (1922) ; People v. Allen,
321 Ill. 11, 151 N. E. 676 (1926) ; State v. McIver, supra, note 5.
'State
v. Richardson (Iowa), 162 N. W. 28 (1917).
"0State v. Mclver, supra, note 5.
Cf. Andrews v. State, 138 S. E. 923 (Ga., 1927). In this case there was
evidence showing that when pursued by a policeman, who suspected him of
transporting whiskey, the defendant caused to be emitted from the exhaust of
his car a dense smoke screen containing carbon monoxide, a poisonous gas
likely to produce death, from the effects of which the policeman ran his car
into the bank several times and suffered from a headache for a day and night.
In reversing a conviction for assault with intent to murder the Court of Appeals said: "There was no evidence showing that the defendants .
knew that this deadly gas would be emitted along with the smoke . .
and
the specific intent to kill is a necessary ingredient of the offense. . . . The
only evidence tending in the slightest degree to show an intent to kill was
wholly circumstantial."
'Taylor v. Jones Construction Co., et al, 193 N. C. 775, 138 S. E. 129
(1927).

:
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ries by reason of defendant's negligence. Mortuary tables were
introduced in evidence to show plaintiff's expectancy. The trial
court charged, in substance, that the mortuary table declared plaintiff's expectancy as a matter of law. In sustaining defendant's exception to the charge as given, and sending the case down for a new
trial, the Supreme Court (per Brogden, J.) points out that the table
is not conclusive, but is by statute 2 expressly declared to be evidentiary only, to be received "with other evidence as to the health, constitution, and habits" of plaintiff. Such is the established doctrine
4
in this state, 3 as well as the decided weight of authority.
The instruction given by the trial court presents an extreme
instance of the confusion incident upon presenting the mortuary
table to the jury as evidence. Aside from the error of declaring
such table conclusive, the charge illustrates the ever present danger
of confusing the jury by verbiage. 5 It is submitted that any statement to the jury to the effect that expectancy is declared by "the
law" or by "statute" is apt to be taken as conclusive unless clearly
modified. The necessity of fitting the instruction to the circumstances and evidence of the particular case negatives the value of
any declared, set formula. However, the charge might well include
so much of the statute as declares that the normal expectancy set
forth in the table is submitted "as evidence, with other evidence as
to the health, constitution, and habits" of plaintiff. The attention
of the jury should be called to the fact that this table shows only the
probable continuance of life of healthy persons who are insurable
risks, and not the duration of ability to earn money ;" also, such
matters as sex, prior state of health, susceptibility to disease, nature
'C. S. (1919) 1790.

'Sledge v. Lumber Co., 140 N. C. 459, 53 S. E. 295 (1906) ; Odum v. Lumber
Co., 173 N. C. 134, 91 S. E. 684 (1917).
'Vicksburg &c. R. Co. v. Putnam, 118 U. S. 545, 30 L. Ed. 257 (1886);
Fifield v. Town of Rochester, 89 Vt. 329, 95 At. 675 (1915) ; 40 L. 1R A. 560,
note.
'That part of the charge which refers to the use of the mortuary table
follows: "Now, the court charges you that the evidence is that the plaintiff
was about 40 years of age at the time of his injury, and according to the
mortuary table, as laid down by the law, he is supposed to live 28 years longer,
under the law, not that he will live that tong, because he might not live but a
very short time; still, he may live longer than 28 years longer, but the law
fixes the limii that he is supposed to live in law as 28 years from the time of
his injury, and that is given for the purpose to enable juries to estimate the
damages that a person is entitled to recover, for the negligence of another
person."

Greer v. Louisville &c. R. Co., 94 Ky. 169, 21 S. W. 549 (1893) ; 2 Sedg-

wick on Damages (9th ed., 1912) § 581.
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of employment (perils attendant thereon, if any), personal habits,
social surroundings, and all other circumstances affecting the probable duration of life as disclosed by the evidence, 7 should be submitted to the consideration of the jury. With these variables plainly
and directly called to the jury's attention, the danger that the table
will be given undue weigh is greatly minimized, and the real purpose
of the statute is promoted.

G. M.

HOOD.

INSURANCE-FALSE
ANSWERS BY AGENT-VODABILITY
POLIcY-LIMITATION'S OF AGENT'S AUTHORITY-In a recent

OF

Vir-

ginia decision' an application for fire insurance was signed in blank.
The application stated that the policy was to be predicated upon it
and that the company was not to be bound by any statement not in
the application. The agent unknown to the applicant, filled in false
answers. Held, the applicant was bound by the answers, on the ground
that it was unpardonable negligence to fail to read the application
signed, and that his negligence made him an instrument in defraud
of the company, which had expressly limited the power of the agent
in order to restrain such acts by the agent.
An agent of an insurance company, according to the view prevailing in a large number of jurisdictions, is agent of the insurer,
whether he fills out the application: (1) on his own information, 2
signing the blank himself, (even when stating expressly that he acts
as agent for the insured) ;3 (2) upon information supplied by the
applicant at the time of filling out the blank;4 (3) after it has been
signed by applicant in blank. 5 This view seems stronger than the
Virginia view, for it considers the technical nature of applications,
as well as the fact that they can be filled out intelligently only by one
acquainted with their technical questions.6 However, the Virginia
view is supported by a number of cases. One of these holds that
where an application says that nothing not contained therein shall
bind the company, if the applicant signs the blank and gives it to the
agent to fill out, he thereby becomes responsible for the agent's ans' See McCaffrey v. Schwartz, 258 Pa. 561, 132 Ati. 810 (1926).
'Royal Ins. Co. v. Poole, 138 S. E. 487 (Va., 1927).
SRoquette v. Farmer'sIns. Co., 191 N. W. 72 (N. D., 1922).

'Standard Auto Assn. v. Russell, 199 Ky. 470, 251 S. W. 628 (1923).

'Arneburg v. Continental Casualty Co., 178 Wis. 428, 190 N. W. 97 (1923).
Guptill v. Pine Tree State Mut. Co., 109 Me. 323, 84 Atl. 529 (1912).
La Marche v. N. Y. Life Ins. Co., 126 Cal. 448, 58 P. 1053 (1899).
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wers. 7 Another declares that where one states over his signature
that he has read the answers given, and that they are true, he is
bound as solemnly as if he had written them himself.8
It is the agent's duty to prepare the application so as to truthfully
state the transaction ;9 his failure is a fault of the company. Since
the agent in preparing the application was within the scope of his
authority,10 any fraud which he commits is the company's, not the
applicant's."1 Filling the application being the agent's duty, it would
be difficult to hold the applicant negligent for trusting an agent,
acquainted with the formalities of insurance, to fill out the signed
blank. This is supported by the fact that it has been held that there
is no negligence in failing to read the blank, either before or after
12
the blank has been filled out.

The general rule is that "agent's knowledge is imputed to the
company, where the agent learned it in the line of duty or within the
scope of his power."'1 In a recent case the insurance company was
held liable, where its agent had falsified a signed application ;14 it was
considered immaterial whether applicant had or had not read it.
Where the signed blank is filled out by the agent, the company can
not rely on the misrepresentations to defeat the policy, unless there
was fraud by the insured, 15 even though the insured did not read it.16
North Carolina holds this view also, for in the absence of fraud
or collusion between insured and agent, knowledge of the agent is
imputed to the company, 17 though a direct stipulation to the contrary appears in the application. 18 An agent can not be held out
'Lama v. Dwelling-Hozse Ins. Co., 50 Mo. App. 447 (1892); Kabok v.
Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co., 51 Hun. 639, 4 N. Y. S. 718, 21 N. Y. St. Reps.

203 8 (1889).

Layton v. N. Y. Life Ins. Co., 55 Cal. A. Reps. 202, 202 P. 958 (1922).
Knights and Ladies of Security v. Bell, 220 P. 594 (Okla., 1923).
10 ContinentalLife Ins. Co. v. Chamberlain, 132 U. S. 304 (1889) ; Donelly
v. Cedar Rapids Ins. Co., 70 Iowa 693, 28 N. W. 607 (1886).
' O'Brian v. Home Benefit Society, 117 N. Y. 310, 22 N. E. 954 (1889);
Bowlus v. Ins. Co., 133 Ind. 106, 32 N. E. 319 (1892).
' Fitchner v. Mut. Fire Ass'n., 103 Iowa 276, 72 N. W. 530 '(1897) ; Germania Life Ins. Co. v. Lukenheimer, 26 N. E. 1082 (Ind., 1891).
UStandard Auto Ass'n. v. Russell, 199 Ky. 470, 251 S. W. 628 (1923);
Davern v. Ass'n. Mut. Liability Ins. Co., 241 N. Y. 318, 150 N. E. 129 (1926).
"Shunmann v. Brownwood Mit. Life Ins. Ass'n., 286 S. W. 200 (Texas,
1926).
' Marston v. Life Ins. Co.. 89 Me. 266, 36 Atl. 389 (1896) ; Donelly v. Cedar
Rapids Ins. Co., 70 Iowa 693, 28 N. W. 607 (1886).
"Rogers v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 23 N. E. 498, 121 Ind. 570 (1890); Sprague
v. Holland Purchase Ins. Co., 69 N. Y. 128 (1877).
I" Gardner v. North State Mut. Life Ins. Co., 163 N. C. 367, 78 S. E. 806

(1913).

INat. Life Ins. Co. v. Grady, 185 N. C. 348, 117 S. E. 289 (1923) ; Niagara
Fire Ins. Co. v. Lee, 73 Tex. 641, 19 S. W. 1030 (1892).
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generally, and a denial of his knowledge be allowed, for his knowledge binding the principal is a legal incident of agency. Cases contra
are "to be deplored."' 19 The North Carolina Supreme Court thinks
that "the greater weight of authority, certainly in the State courts,"
denies "the efficacy of a clause withdrawing from the agent the power
to bind the principal by his knowledge." 20 However, statute requires
the standard fire insurance policy, and this allows waiver of its pro21
visions only in writing.
Formerly men applied to the underwriter, and the greatest good
faith was required of the applicant;22 today the competing agents
apply to the applicants, in effect, and the majority view seems to
protect the careless applicant, who, regarding the application as a
mere formality full of technicalities, fails to read what he has
signed. 23 What is apparently the minority view stoutly maintains
that the parties are bound by their solemn contract, that it was negligence for the applicant not to read what he signed, and that the company should not be forced to rely on parol evidence.

D. S.
MUNICIPAL

CORPORATIONS-LIABILITY

FOR

GARDNER.

BREAK IN

WATER

MAI-In Parks-Belk Co. v. City of Concord,' the plaintiff seeks to
recover for damages caused by a break in the city water main. The
main was part of the municipal water system and was used to distribute water for fire protection as well as for commercial and sanitary use. Charges were made for the water which was distributed
through this and other mains to private individuals. An employee
of the defendant was flushing the street from one of the hydrants,
when, plaintiff alleges, he so negligently cut off the water that the
main burst and as a consequence the basement of plaintiff's store
was flooded and damage done to goods. The defendant city sets up
that it was an act in the course of its exercise of governmental power.
Plaintiff sets up that since charges were made for the water that it
was acting in the nature of a private enterprise. Motion for judgment as of non-suit was allowed in lower court. Affirmed.
Vance, Insurance, pp. 304-305.
"Fishblate v. Fidelity Co., 140 N. C. 589, 53 S. E. 354 (1906).
'Black v. Atl. Home Ins. Co., 148 N. C. 169, 61 S. E. 672 (1908); construing N. C. Cons. Stats. 6436-6437.
"Stubbins v. State Farmer's Mut. Ins. Co. of Mo., 229 S. W. 407 (1921);
Kearns v. N. A. Life and Casualty Co., 150 Minn. 486, 185 N. W. 659 (1921).
'Follete v. U. S. Mut. Accident Ass'n., 110 N. C. 143, 14 S. E. 923 (1892).
'Parks-Belk Co. v. City of Concord, 194 N. C. 134, 138 S. E. 599 (1927).

RECENT CASE COMMENTS
The first question is whether there is a difference in liability
when a city is exercising its governmental power and when it is acting
as a private enterprise. It has been laid down in North Carolina
2
cases that there is a distinct difference. When a municipal corporation acts in its governmental capacity it may not be held liable for
the acts of its employees or agents except where so provided by
statute. Since it is established that there is a difference, the next
question is: when is a municipal corporation acting as a private
enterprise? Where electric power from a municipal plant is used
not only for illuminating the streets but also is sold to individuals the
city was held liable for the death of a person who stepped upon a
live wire which had been negligently left in the street.3 In regard to
water plants the city has been held liable when the city superintendent
assaulted a consumer who was offering payment for water which
he had used. 4 Along this same line, the operation of a sewer for
which no charge was made has been held to create no liability when
sickness is caused by the discharge from it into a stream, 5 but when
this discharge amounts to the taking of property by the creation of
a nuisance there is liability for the property damage but not for the
personal damage. 6 Where there is only a nominal charge for operating, as in the case of an incinerator, it may be assumed that there is
no liability since it is not in operation for profit but merely for the
public benefit.7 In a recent case from Georgia it was held that when
the city operated a water plant and chemicals, used to purify the
water, made it unfit for certain purposes, that the city was liable
for failure to notify of this fact.8 Also, in a recent Virginia case
it was held that the city was liable when one of its employees was
negligent in cutting off the water supply when requested and as a
result a warehouse was flooded. 9 These cases seem to establish that
'Price v. Board of Trustees, 172 N. C. 84, 89 S. E. 1066 (1916) ; Mcllhen-

ney v. Wilmington, 127 N. C. 146, 37 S. E. 187 (1900).
'Fisher v. New Bern, 140 N. C. 506, 53 S. E. 342 (1906).

'Munich v. Durham, 181 N. C. 188, 106 S. E. 665 (1921); cf. Mack v.

Charlotte, 181 N. C. 383, 385, 107 S. E. 244 (1921).

'Metzv. Asheville, 150 N. C. 748, 64 S. E. 881 (1909).

'Donnell v. Greensboro, 164 N. C. 330, 80 S. E. 377 (1913) ; cf. Hines v.
Rocky Mount, 162 N. C. 409, 78 S. E. 510 (1913), in support of the proposition
of the liability of a municipalcorporation for the taking of property in
creating a nuisance and also a strong dissenting opinion concerning liability

for sickness caused by the same.

v. Winston-Salem, 189 N. C 469, 127 S. E. 543 (1925).
'Scales
8
City of Griffin v. Griffin Bottling Co., 134 S. E. 812 (Ga., 1926).
:Richmond v. Bonded Warehouse Corp., 138 S. E. 503 (Va., 1927).
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a municipality is acting as a private enterprise when it operates any
branch for which a charge is made and a profit is derived therefrom.
ANDREW MCINToSH.
PROcEDURE-DISTINCTION

BETWEEN SUBSTANTIVE AND ADJEC-

TIVE LAw-In the case of Atchinson, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Spencer'
the plaintiff brought action for injuries sustained in a collision with
-defendant's train in New Mexico. The undisputed evidence showed
-that the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence in pushing a
disabled motor truck upon the crossing without looking for an ap-proaching train. The Arizona constitution provides that "The
defense of contributory negligence or of assumption of risk shall,
in all cases whatsoever, be a question of fact and shall, at all times,
be left to the jury."12 Defendant's motion for a directed verdict was
denied, and judgment having been given for the plaintiff, defendant
appealed. Held, that the Arizona constitutional provision is essentially a rule of substantive law which federal conformity act 8 does
not require federal courts to apply and the judgment was reversed.
Generally speaking substantive law denotes the rule that determines the legal relations of the parties when all the facts are known
to the court, while adjective law has to do with the process by which
the facts are made known.4 "Substantive law is law which creates,
-defines, and regulates rights, as opposed to adjective law or remedial
law which prescribes the method of enforcing rights or obtaining
redress for their invasion." 5
It has been held that burden of proof as to whether an employee
of a railroad is guilty of contributory negligence is a matter of substantive law. 6 There are other cases, however, which indicate that
burden of proof is merely a matter of procedure, 7 and this seems to
be the better view.8 The conflict of views shows that the line between
substantive and adjective law is very obscure.
'Atchinson, T. & S. F.Ry. Co. v. Spencer, 20 Fed. (2d.) 714 (C. C. A. 9th.,
1927).
'Ariz. Const., Art. 8, sec. 5.
'Rev. St. U. S., sec. 914; U. S. Comp. St., 1901, p. 684.
(1924) 33 Yale L. J. 308, 310.
'Mix v. Comn'rv of Nez Perce Co., 18 Idaho 695, 112 Pac. 215, 32 L. R. A.
(N. S.) 534 (1910).
Central Vt. R. v. White, 238 U. S. 507 (1915).
'See Wallace v. Ry., 104 N. C. 442, 450, 10 S. E. 552, 553 (1889) ; South
Ind. R. Co. v. Peyton, 61 N. E. 722, 723 (Ind., 1901); Duggan v. Bay State
R. Co., 119 N. E. 757, 759 (Mass., 1918).
' (1915) 29 Harv. L. Rev. 95 and cases cited.

RECENT CASE COMMENTS
The Arizona court has held that under the Arizona constitutional
provision in question the power to settle the question of contributory
negligence, regardless of the evidence, is transferred from court to
jury, and the jury's verdict is conclusive on the court.9 The defense
of contributory negligence is not entirely removed or destroyed by
the provision. It is merely shifted to a different arm of the court.
Such defense is committed to the fact finding body in all cases, and
the change effected would seem to be essentially procedural. The
fact that juries are likely to disregard the defense entirely at times
proves nothing as to the nature of the change.
Barrett v. Virginia R. Co.10 is cited by the court in the principal
case as authority for the doctrine that federal courts should direct
verdicts in cases of undisputed evidence, and that the rule "is not
subject to modification by state statutes or constitutions." But no
state statute or constitutional provision was involved in that case,
and it depended on three other cases'" as authority for the proposition quoted. Those cases were in regard to state statutes regulating
the mode of submitting cases to the jury, and the courts held that
such regulations were not within the purview of the federal conformity act,' 2 which requires conformity "as near as may be" to the
local practice. The reasoning in these cases, unlike the principal
case, was not primarily that the state statutes were rules of substantive law. It would seem that the principal decision might better
have been justified on the ground that the Arizona constitutional
provision 13 is not within the purview of the federal conformity act
without deciding that the provision is necessarily a rule of substanC. W. HALL.
tive law. 14
REGISTRATION OF

DEEDS-PROPER INDEXING--Where Harrison

and wife executed two deeds of trust for the same porperty, the first
being recorded but indexed under the sub-division "Haa" to "Hap"
and the second recorded and and appropriately indexed under the
'Inspiration v. Conwell, 21 Ariz. 48, 190 Pac. 88 (1920) ; Pacific etc. Co. v.

Cochran, 243 Pac. 405 (Ariz., 1926). Such provisions do not violate the U. S.
Const. Chicago R. L & P. R. Co. v. Cole, 251 U. S. 54, 40 Sup. Ct. Rep. 68
(1919).
".Barrett v. Va. Ry. Co., 250 U. S. 473, 39 Sup. Ct. Rep. 540 (1919).

'Lincoln v. Power, 151 U. S. 436, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 387 (1893); Indianapolis R. R. Co. v. Horstj 93 U. S. 291, 23 L. Ed. 898 (1876) ; St. Louis R. v.

Vickers, 122 U. S. 360, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1216 (1886).
Note 3, supra.
"Note 1, supra.
*' Statutes prohibiting trial judges from directing verdicts have been held
to be matters of procedure which the legislature can regulate. Zimmerman v.
N. W. R. Co., 129 Minn. 4, 151 N. W. 412 (1915).
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sub-division "Har" to "Haz"; the Supreme Court sustained a restraining order on the sale of the property under the second deed,
declaring the first instrument "was sufficiently registered and indexed
so as to constitute a lien upon the land." Clement v. Harrison
(1927) 193 N. C. 825, 138 S. E. 308.
That "the statute (C. S. 3561) upon its face, apparently, does
not contemplate the division of the index into subheads"' is a correct interpretation 2 and therefore the first deed was recorded and
indexed "under the appropriate letter of the alphabet,"3 "H."
The decision, in resolving the question of sufficiency of the indexing in compliance with the statute, recognized that the existing practice in regard to recording went beyond that contemplated by C. S.
3561 as sufficient. In the light of this decision and those of the
past it is obvious that the register of deeds has performed his duty
if he indexes anywhere under the letter "H" and he is not liable to
the subsequent grantee for his mistake in indexing under the wrong
sub-division of the letter "H."14 From this reasonably justified conclusion the question that next presents itself is whether the abstracter
searching the records is liable to his client for failure to perform his
duty if he looks only under the appropriate sub-divisions of the
"appropriate" letter of the alphabet? Convenient sub-divisions are
used in most of the counties and the practice of the searcher is to
limit his inspection to the immediate subdivision. The decision in
the principal case would seem to impose on the abstracter a burden
additional to the present practice in searching titles and which may
properly be regarded by them as unreasonable. Although the decision works a hardship on the abstracter, the solution now lies with
the legislature. "That it is a great convenience and in populous
counties of the state has become a necessity, is evident, but it is the
province of the legislature, and not of the court, to make this convenience the subject of law." 5
F. B. GTJmmEY II.
'Clement v. Harrison (1927), 193 N. C. 825, 829, 138 S. E. 308.
'Schell v. Stein (1874), 76 Pa. St. 398, 18 Am. Rep. 416; Bishop v,
Schneider (1870), 46 Mo. 472, 2 Am. Rep. 533; Chatham v. Bradford (1873),
50 Ga. 327, 15 Am. Rep. 692; Armstrong v. Austin (1895), 45 S. C. 69, 22
S. E. 763.
'Clement v. Harrison (1927), 193 N. C. 825, 138 S. E. 308.
'Daniel v. Giggard (1895), 117 N. C 106, 23 S. E. 93; Mft. Co. v. Hester
(1919), 177 N. C. 609, 98 S. E. 721. Note that in both of these cases the
facts showed there was an improper indexing under C. S. 3561.
'Schell v. Stein (1874), 76 Pa. St. 398, 18 Am. Rep .416, from Justice
Agnew's decision in a case which held that a deed was not defectively recorded and indexed in the separate index appropriated to the books as called
for by statute, but recorder failed to make an entry in a general index which
was an established practice.

RECENT CASE COMMENTS
RELIGIOUS SOCIETIES-RULES AND GOVERNMENT-CONTROL OF
PROPERTY-The majority of the Dan River Primitive Baptist church
called a pastor who had been expelled from the Danville, Virginia,
Primitive Baptist church. By custom among Primitive Baptist
churches a member excluded from one church cannot join another
of like faith until he has been restored to the church which expelled
him, and churches must declare nonfellowship with the church which
receives him in disregard of this usage. Plaintiffs, the minority faction of the Dan River church, declared nonfellowship with defendants, the majority, and brought this action for the possession of the
church property. Jury found that the plaintiffs, though a minority,
were the true church and entitled to the property. Judgment was
thereupon given for plaintiffs. On appeal the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment below. Dix v. Pruitt, 194 N. C. 64, 138 S. E.
412 (1927).
Courts have no power to pass upon differences between factions
of a church unless civil or property rights are involved and may only
enforce execution of an ascertained trust.' One court, however, has
2
refused even this.
The United States Supreme Court has divided controversies in
civil courts concerning property rights of religious societies into
three classes:
1. Where the property in question was devoted by the express
terms of the grant by which it was acquired to the support of specific doctrines. In such cases the court will inquire into the faith
of the contending parties and see that the property is hot diverted
from the trust.
2. Where the society which owned the property is of the strictly
congregational form of government, owing no submission to any
organization outside the congregation. Here dispute is to be determined by the majority of the society or by its rules.
3. Where the society is one of a number united to form a more
general body of churches with ecclesiastical control over the societies
of which it is composed. In such cases the general body must decide
all questions of faith, rule, and custom.3
See Stallings v. Finney, 287 111. 145, 122 N. E. 369, 370 (1919) ; Smith v.
Pedigo, 145 Ind. 361, 33 N. E. 777, 781 (1893) ; Mt. Helm Baptist Church v.
Jones, 30 So. 714, 716 (Miss., 1901) ; Mendelsohn v. Gordon, 156 S. W. 1149
(Tex., 1913).
'Smith v. Charles, 24 So. 968 (Miss., 1899).
See Watson v. Jones, 13 Wall. 679, 722 (1899).
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"From a strictly logical point of view this classification seems
faulty, for the reason that the first class rests on a different basis of
classification than the second or third, with the result that neither
the first and second, nor the first and third are mutually exclusive."'
The rule announced in the second classification, moreover, in which
class Dix v. Pruitt falls, is not sustained by the weight of authority.
The general rule seems to be that in a "congregational" church,
property of a divided congregation is in that part which whether a
majority or a minority, is acting in harmony with its own doctrine,
laws, customs, and principles which were accepted among them before the dispute began. 5 The reason for the rule seems to be that
property conveyed to trustees for the use of a church by its denominational name creates an implied trust for the promulgation of the
doctrines of that denomination as they were at the time the property
was acquired. 6
Courts have invariably said that the title to church property is
in that faction which adheres to the "organization and doctrines"
which were accepted before the schism. 7 Upon examination of the
cases involving dispute in congregational churches, however, it will
be found that the schism there considered was over doctrinal questions. Dix v. Pruitt goes farther than any case decided in that property of an independent, congregational church has been forfeited
because of a departure, not from doctrine, but from a general rule
of government and organization of the denomination. The question
of who shall be admitted to membership and made pastor, as the
court in the principal case recognizes, 8 is a question of local
government.
From this case it appears that the independence of congregational

'24 L.R.A. (N. S.) 695, note.

'Smith v. Pedigo, 145 Ind. 361, 33 N. E. 777 (1893) ; Christian Church v.
Church of Christ, 219 IlM.
503, 76 N.E.703 (1906) ; Monk v.Little, 182 S. W.
511 (Ark., 1916); Mt. Helm Baptist Church v. Jones, supra, note 1; Bose v.
Christ, 193 Pa. St. 13, 44 A. 240 (1899); Karoly v.Hungarian Reformed
Church of New BrunsAick, 83 N. J. Eq. 514, 91 AtI. 808 (1914); True Reformed Dutch Church of Paramus v.Iserman, 64 N. J. Law 506, 45 Ati. 771
(1900) ; Apostolic Holiness Union of Post Falls v.Knudson, 21 Idaho 589, 123
Pac. 473 (1912). Contra: First Baptist Church of Paris v.Fort, 93 Tex. 215,
54 S.W. 892 (1900) ; Baptist Church v.Lattimer, 103 Neb. 755, 174 N. W. 296
(1919) ; Keyser v.Stansifer,6 Ohio 363 (1834).
'Hale v.Everett, 53 N. H. 9 (1868); Landrith v.Hudgis, 121 Tenn. 556,
102 S.W. 783 (1907); Greek Catholic Church v.Orthodox Greek Church,
195 Pa. 425, 46 A. 72 (1900). Contra: First Baptist Church of Paris v. Fort,
93 Tex.215, 54 S.W. 892 (1900).
"See note 5,supra.

'Dix v. Pruitt, 194 N. C. 64, 66, 138 S.E.412, 414.

RECENT CASE COMMENTS
churches is much more limited by general denominational rules
among like churches than courts have heretofore indicated. Whereas
in churches of the connectional type the governing body decides what
is the true faith and order and who is adhering to it, in congregational
churches it is a question of fact in each case for the jury.9 Certainly
the dictum in Conference v. Allen,' 0 that in congregational churches
"the individual congregation is each an independent republic, governed by the majority of its members and subject to control or
supervision by no higher authority" is now denied. Under the decision in the principal case the jury might find that one man was
the true church and thus entitled to the property even though the
majority were in accord upon doctrinal matters." The jury might
.also find that an optional custom prevalent in fact among only a
few churches was a rule of the denomination.
The effect of this decision is to prevent any alteration not only
of belief but even of denominational rules of government by the
congregation so long as one person supports the original tenets. "A
majority of a congregational church is supreme so long as it remains
true to the fundamental usages, customs, doctrines, practice, and
organization of the denomination."' 1 As to what the majority of a
congregational church can do which the majority of a connectional
church cannot do, quare?
S. SHARP.
SURETYSHIP-CONTRACTORS'

BOND-MATERIALMEN-

STATUTE

REQuIRiNG BOND--A contractor agreed to construct four steel barges
for the United States,' and gave a performance bond with an indemnity company as surety. The bond incorporated the contract,
which provided that the contractors, "at their risk and expense,"
shall construct the barges and "procure and keep in force all such
bonds for the protection of claims by laborers and materialmen as
may be required by the laws of the United States." No such bond
was given however. In an action on the bond by materialmen, held
'Cases cited in note 5 were tried without a jury but it is clear that what
are is a question of fact.
-the 10doctrines
of av. congregational
church
Conference
Allen, 156 N. C.
524, 526, 72 S. E. 617, 618 (1911).
' Windley v. McCliney, 161 N. C. 318, 77 S. E. 226 (1913) at first glance
-would seem to be overruled but the facts in that case may be taken to be that
the changes made were not in fundamental usages and customs of the church
as the court indicates.
'Dix. v. Pruitt, 194 N. C. 64, 69, 138 S. E.415.
United States v. Starr, 20 Fed. (2d) 803 (C. C. A. 4th, 1927).
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for the surety; that the Hurd Act, 2 requiring that a contractor's
bond shall cover claims of laborers and materialmen, did not authorize a recovery where neither the bond nor the contract contained any
such obligation.
The following stipulations in performance bonds of contractors
have been held not to subject sureties to any liability to laborers or
materialmen: "to furnish materials therefor at his own expense";8
"to perform free and clear of all claims or liens for labor or materials" ;4 "to provide all materials and to perform all work necessary" ;5 "to give bond obligating themselves to pay the claims of
materialmen" (but actually no such bond is given) ;0 or that they
"would provide the labor and materials at their own cost." T Bonds
of the above types do not provide for the payment of materialmen
as required by the statutes, nor do the contracts contain such provisions. An obligation to "furnish" materials is not an obligation
to pay materialmen. 8 In the cases where materialmen have recovered from sureties, there are stipulations using the statutory language
that the contractor agrees to pay for the materials. The mere requirement of a statute that a bond contain an obligation does not of
itself incorporate the obligation in the bond.10
The laborers and materialmen can not recover from sureties on a
contractor's bond, where the contract provides that a bond for their
protection shall be furnished as required by law, but the bond itself
contains no such provision, is well settled, 11
Because of decisions exempting surety companies on more or
'Hurd Act (1905) amending Act Aug. 13, 1894 (Comp. St., sec. 6923).
' Warner v. Halyburton, 187 N. C. 414, 121 S. E. 756 (1924).
'Electrical Appliance Co. v. U. S. Fidelity & G. Co., 110 Wis. 434, 85 N. W.
648 (1901).
"Lumber Co. v. School District, 121 Iowa 663, 97 N. W. 72 (1903); McCausland v. Construction Co., 172 N. C.708, 90 S.E.1010 (1916).
*Babcock v. American Surety Co., 236 Fed. 34 (C.C.A. 8th, 1916).
GreenfieldLumber & Ice Co. v. Parker,159 Ind. 511, 65 N. E.747 (1902).
"Babcock v. American Surety Co., supra, note 6; United States v. Steward,
288 Fed. 187 (C.C.A. 8th, 1923).
"Ingold v. Hickory, 178 N. C. 614, 101 S.E. 525 (1919); Supply Co. v.

Lumber Co., 160 N. C. 428, 76 S.E. 273 (1912) ;Hartford Accident & I. Co.
v. Board of Education, 15 Fed. (2d) 317 (C.C.A.4th, 1926) ;Peakc v. U. S.,
16 App.D. C.415 (1900).
10 United States v. Montgomery Heating & V. Co., 255 Fed. 683 (C.C.A.
5th, 1919).

'Babcock v. American Surety Co., supra, note 6 (contractor agreed to
comply strictly with statute for protection of materialmen and laborers, but
bond did not contain statutory provision); United States v. Stewart, supra,
note 8 (government circular requesting bids and made part of contract, required a stipulation in bond which was omitted from actual bond).
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less technical reasoning, the North Carolina legislature amended its
law to provide that the obligation to pay materialmen and laborers
is conclusively presumed to be incomporated in the bond, whether
the bond actually incorporates the statute or not. 12 This attempt to
give an absolute protection should be followed by congress, since no
lien may be filed on public ,buildings, and so laborers and materialmen are in need of the security offered by statute incorporating the
obligation to pay in the bond, which can not be defeated by the
omission of some particular language.
C. W. MCANALLY.
'Public Laws N. C. (1923), chapter 100, amending C. S. 2445; Standard

Electric Co. v. Deposit Co., 191 N. C. 653, 132 S. E. 808 (1926).

